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ABSTRACT 
Title Creation of post-M&A performance: Similarities versus dissimilarities in 
resource allocation 
Seminar date August 28th 2014 (15 ECTS) 
Course BUSP69 Degree Project II in Finance 
Author Elisa Hrund Gunnarsdottir 
Advisor Susanne Arvidsson 
Keywords Mergers, acquisitions, M&A, resource allocation, resource based view, 
strategic fit, synergy, merger waves, corporate governance, multiple linear 
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Purpose The main purpose of the thesis is to increase support with either of earlier 
made arguments of resource allocation and post-M&A performance, that is 
whether similarities or dissimilarities in resource allocation between an 
acquiring company and a target rather increase performance. 
Theoretical  
framework The thesis is based on the idea of resource based view (RBV), that is that 
firm’s competitive advantages lie in its resources. However, there are 
contradicting notions regarding resource allocation in M&A’s, that is 
whether similarities or dissimilarities in resource allocation between the 
acquirer and target rather create synergies and therefore increase post-M&A 
performance.  
Methodology The dataset consists of longitudinal data, that is for each set of companies, 
their performance is measured at two points in time; before and after the 
M&A. Deductive approach is used to test the contradicting arguments from 
previous studies. Using a multiple linear regression analysis determines the 
exact relationship between the explanatory variables chosen and post-M&A 
performance. 
Empirical  
foundation This study is based on chosen numbers from annual statements of 
companies involved in 86 M&A transactions, 55 from the US and 31 from 
Europe, taking place in the sixth merger wave, from 2003 to 2007.  
Conclusion The larger part of the explanatory variables chosen is found statistically 
insignificant, resulting from the small dataset at hand. Due to an apparent 
problem of multicollinearity the results of this study need to be taken with 
caution. However, the results indicate that for the US, dissimilarities in 
resource allocation rather increase post-M&A performance whereas the 
results are not as clear for Europe. The results make it difficult to state 
anything about the influence of different governance systems on M&A 
performance whilst different time periods, in regards of merger activity, do 
not seem to have any influence. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
During the 1970s and 1980s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) increased drastically in 
popularity (Lamont and Anderson, 1985; Porter, 1987). Since then a pattern of M&A waves 
has been observed where in certain time periods M&A transactions increase significantly over 
a relatively short period of time with intense activity. During the last century more than half 
of all M&A transactions has clustered within those waves (Kolev, Haleblian and McNamara, 
2012). For example, during the dot-com bubble in the 1990s dollars spent in M&A was five 
times higher than ten years earlier and close to fifty times higher than twenty years earlier 
(Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2010). 
As a result, the topic of M&A has been widely researched and is still a very frequent topic in 
both research and academic discussion. But even though there has been a significant amount 
of research on M&A’s there is still need for even more research to gain a better understanding 
and provide recommendation that will enhance the success of M&A’s (Hitt, King, Krishnan, 
Makri, Schijven, Shimizu and Zhu, 2009). Even though previous researches on M&A’s are 
diverse there is one notion that is the most commonly debated one, that is whether a merged 
company is better off than the two companies separately (see e.g. Jensen, 1988). The answer 
to this, as well as to other notions in M&A research, has been in many cases inconsistent (Das 
and Kapil, 2012). 
Even though M&A’s are conducted in order to pursue different benefits evidence shows that 
in general the main rationale for the transactions is to maximize a firm’s value (Salter and 
Weinhold, 1979). The dominant argument is that to create value firms should acquire 
somehow related firms which through synergies increases efficiency, either based on 
economies of scale or scope or skill transfer of some kind (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson and 
Ireland, 1991). However, studies have shown that M&A transactions create little or no value 
on average and often firms fail to achieve a significant success. In some cases M&A’s 
generate negative value since they create problems that managers fail to solve (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006; Hitt, King, Krishnan, Makri, Schijven, Shimizu and Zhu, 2012; King, 
Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004).  
Value is a function of a cash flow so for strategy to create value cash flow or expected future 
cash flows must increase (Schweiger and Lippert, 2005). In management, such as marketing, 
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operations, human resources and strategy, organizational performance is commonly the 
dependent variable of interest when it comes to value creation. Performance is one type of 
effectiveness indicator and includes three areas of company outcomes (Richard, Yip and 
Johnson, 2009). The most common measure of performance in M&A’s is shareholder return. 
When maximizing M&A’s success in terms of shareholder value there are two groups needed 
to be considered; the shareholders of the acquiring company and the shareholders of the target 
company. Empirical studies have shown that on average some value is created for the 
shareholders of the target company, whilst the same is not true for the shareholders of the 
acquiring company (see e.g. Bruner, 2001). Other areas of company outcomes included in 
performance are financial performance, e.g. profits, return on equity and return on assets, and 
product market performance, e.g. sales and market share, which as the shareholder value is 
easily observed (Campa and Hernando, 2004; Richard, Yip and Johnson, 2009). M&A’s can 
also affect social value which includes effects on other economic agents, such as employees, 
suppliers and communities. Those effects however are not as easily measured (Campa and 
Hernando, 2004). 
1.2 Problem discussion 
As mentioned before, scholars and the academic world don’t agree on whether merged 
companies are better off than the two companies separately. There is also a debate about 
which factors rather increase the possibility of a successful merger. According to Porter 
(1987), for M&A’s to be successful companies should focus on its core competences and stick 
to their set strategy and thus the acquiring company and the target company should have 
strategies that are alike or similar. Porter’s idea of strategic fit is supported by many others 
(see e.g. Chatterjee, 1986; Salter and Weinhold, 1979; Singh and Montgomery, 1987). Fewer 
have contradicted the idea of strategic fit. Harrison et.al (1991) suggest that dissimilarities 
between the acquiring company and the target company allows the companies to learn from 
each other and therefore create greater synergies and better performance compared to 
similarities. To get by the problem that companies’ strategies are not always easily accessible 
to outsiders Harrison et.al focused on resource allocation rather than strategy since some 
scholars have suggested that similarities in strategy may indicate similarities in resource 
allocation (Beard and Dess, 1981; Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986). 
In their research, Harrison et.al. (1991) concluded that for M&A’s in the US in the 70’s and 
80’s dissimilarities in resource allocation may provide unique and valuable synergy and thus 
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increase performance. A similar study was conducted for M&A’s in the EU in the 90’s where 
it was found that dissimilarities in some resource allocations have positive effect on 
performance whilst for other resource allocations similarities increase performance 
(Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008). Differences in those two researches could be explained by 
different time periods or different corporate governance systems between the US and EU. The 
70s and the 80s can be considered as a rather conservative time in M&A activity whilst during 
the 90s an M&A wave was peaking, especially in certain industries like banking, health care 
and technology (University of Torino, 2012). In regards of corporate governance systems, the 
market oriented shareholder perspective is dominant in the US where the focus is on short-
term returns, whereas in the EU the market is network oriented and focuses on long-term 
investment perspective (Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008). Others have also found contradictive 
results, especially in the financial sector which is the largest acquiring sector (Buelens, 2008). 
Ramaswamy (1997) concluded that strategic similarities in the US banking industry in the 80s 
had positive influence on post-M&A performance, which is in line with Porter’s idea. 
Altunbas and Marqués (2008) based their research on Ramaswamy‘s model but used data for 
the banking industry in the EU in the 90s. Their results where more in line with the results of 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg, that is they concluded that for some factors in resource allocation 
similarities have positive influence on post-M&A performance whilst for other factors 
dissimilarities are found to improve performance.  
Previous empirical results on resource allocation and M&A performance therefore support the 
debate on which factors rather increase the possibility of a successful merger.  It seems to be 
that both different time periods and different geographical locations give contradicting results 
on whether companies should focus on similarities or dissimilarities in resource allocation to 
increase post-M&A performance. To the author’s knowledge there has never been conducted 
a study using a sample from different geographical areas so there is a lack of comparison of 
results in different areas. There have also not been conducted studies, to the author’s notice, 
which use data from the latest merger wave, which took place from 2003 till 2007. These 
contradicting results of previous empirical studies and a lack of comparable studies, both in 
regards of geographical areas and time periods, are the foundation for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
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1.3 Purpose 
The main purpose of this thesis is to increase support with either of the earlier made 
arguments of resource allocations and post-M&A performance by analyzing whether 
similarities or dissimilarities in resource allocations between an acquiring company and a 
target company rather increase performance, using a replication of a study by Harrison et.al 
(1991) and an extension by Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008). Since previous studies have been 
conducted for different geographical areas and different time periods there is a lack of 
comparability between those studies. Therefore, the second purpose of this thesis is to 
compare the results of US and Europe using data from the same time period to see whether 
the contradicting results of previous studies can be explained by different time periods or 
differences in corporate governance structure.  
To fulfil these purposes the thesis will answer the following research questions: 
 Do similarities or dissimilarities in resource allocations between an acquirer and a 
target rather increase post-M&A performance? 
 Do different time periods support different arguments of resource allocations and post-
M&A performance? 
 Do different governance structures support different arguments of resource allocations 
and post-M&A performance? 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
The thesis focuses on the effects on performance change from similarities and dissimilarities 
in pre-M&A resource allocations between the acquiring company and the target. Therefore 
the explanatory variables used only explain potential synergies from economies of scope and 
not from economies of scale. 
Also, the thesis focuses on manager’s point of view and not on the shareholders by looking at 
the companies’ financial performance and not the value creation through increased stock 
prices. However, no M&A would be interesting unless it increases the owners’ value in terms 
of stock price improvements, which can be considered as more of a short-term perspective, 
looking at immediate changes in stock prices. Thus, the focal point of the thesis is the long-
term perspective where future profits are more important. Finally, the dataset only includes 
companies involved in M&A transactions that were carried out in the sixth merger wave, 
between 2003 and 2007, and where the acquirer is registered in either the US or in Europe, 
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with some further restrictions. That results in a rather small dataset which can cause empirical 
problems and lessens the credibility of the study. 
1.5 Thesis outline 
The remaining of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
framework as well as some of the relevant previous literature. Chapter 3 presents the 
methodology of the analysis, the data collection as well as the variables included in the study. 
The empirical results are presented in Chapter 4, followed by analysis of the results. Finally 
Chapter 5 includes some concluding remarks and recommendations for further studies. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that, given no asymmetric information, markets 
are efficient and all assets are priced at its true value given all available information. 
According to the EMH M&A’s should not be driven by speculations but rather by expected 
synergies (Fama, 1970). According to theory, synergy is the most important factor for value 
creation in M&A transactions (Harrison et.al., 1991). However, scholars disagree on whether 
synergies are created through similarities or dissimilarities in resource allocation between an 
acquirer and a target (see e.g. Harrison et.al., 1991; Porter, 1996). This chapter covers the 
theory of value creation through synergies and performance measures as well as the different 
arguments for synergy creation in similarities and dissimilarities in resource allocations. 
Finally, merger waves and institutional theory of different corporate governance systems is 
discussed to try to explain the contradictive results of previous studies. 
2.1 Value creation through synergies 
The term synergy is more commonly associated with physical sciences rather than with 
economics and finance, where it refers to the reactions occurring when two factors are 
combined to yield greater effect together than the sum of the two independently (Gaughan, 
2002). In economics and finance most scholars agree that a success of M&A transactions can 
be defined as the creation of synergies, i.e. that the merged company has greater value than 
the two companies separately, where the synergies are created through either economies of 
scale or scope or skill transfer of some kind (Ansoff, 1965; Cording, Christmann and 
Bourgeois III, 2002). Synergies can be divided into operating synergies and financial 
synergies, where operating synergies can be further divided into revenue enhancers and cost 
reductions and financial synergies can be divided into risk and value (Gaughan, 2002; 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008). 
Even though synergies are the expected outcome from M&A’s, value creation through 
synergies rarely a fact since 70% of all M&A’s generate a negative net present value (NPV). 
The reason that M&A tend to be unsuccessful in creating synergies can be divided into 
subgroups; the winners curse, hubris and the free rider problem. The winners curse arises 
when several companies believe that acquiring a certain target will generate synergies and 
hence enter into a price bidding war where the highest bidder estimates the greatest potential 
synergies and is likely to overpay for the transaction, resulting in a negative NPV. Hubris 
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appears when the management of the acquiring company overestimates their expertise and 
skills and therefore expects greater synergies than then are achieved. When the minority 
shareholders of the target company are difficult to get rid of after the merger the free rider 
problem arises. These shareholders tend to free ride on the expected synergies and the price 
for getting rid of them is higher than for other shareholders and thus takes up a large portion 
of the expected synergies which can then result in negative NPV (Johnson, Scholes and 
Whittington, 2008). According to Lubatkin (1983) the reason for previous empirical studies 
showing unsuccessful value creations in M&A transactions might also be due to methodical 
problems in quantifying synergies. 
2.2 Measuring M&A performance  
As mentioned earlier the most common measures of performance in M&A are shareholder 
return, financial performance and product market performance (Campa and Hernando, 2004; 
Richard, Yip and Johnson, 2009). According to Gates and Very (2003) there is no one way 
better than other to measure M&A performance, the appropriate measure depends on the 
acquisition strategy and the expected synergies. Although, the most common measure of 
M&A performance is shareholder return that may not necessarily be the best measure as it is 
driven by many factors that are not controllable by the firm and its managers. Instead 
financial performance is often used as a measure for M&A performance (Meglio and Risberg, 
2011). The rationale behind using financial performance, measured by different accounting-
based measures, to evaluate the success of M&A’s is that the strategic aim of a business is to 
earn adequate return on capital and the synergies obtained from M&A transactions are best 
reflected in accounting measures (Papadakis and Thanos, 2010). 
2.2.1 Accounting-based measures  
Management scholars and others have mainly relied on accounting-based measures for M&A 
performance for three reasons. First, accounting-based measures measure actual, realized 
M&A performance as reported in annual financial statements, which is an advantage over 
other measures of M&A performance which measure investors’ expectations for the future. 
Second, accounting-based measures can measure different features of M&A performance so 
by combining multiple accounting-based measures within a single study a more integrated 
view of M&A performance can be obtained. Third, synergies created in M&A’s are reflected 
in long-term accounting performance improvements and therefore researchers can evaluate 
the realization of synergies using accounting-based measures (Thanos and Papadakis, 2012). 
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In M&A literature and empirical research return on assets (ROA) appears to be the most 
commonly used accounting-based ratio, as a measure of performance. One of the reasons for 
that is that ROA is less influenced by biases that other ratios, such as return on equity (ROE) 
and return on sales (ROS) can suffer from (Meeks and Meeks, 1981; Thanos and Papadakis, 
2012). 
When using ROA as measure of M&A performance scholars most commonly compare ROA 
before the M&A transaction, of either the acquiring firm or combination of the target and the 
acquirer, with ROA of the merged firm after some time. However, this method has received 
some criticism since the calculation overlooks industry influences. To overcome this criticism 
some scholars have used industry adjusted ROA where the average industry ROA is 
subtracted from the firm’s ROA (Thanos and Papadakis, 2012). 
Although accounting-based measures have their advantages, there are also some limitations to 
relying only on accounting-based measures for determining the success of M&A’s. First, non-
financial performance can’t be captured using accounting-based measures. Second, 
accounting-based measures cannot evaluate other M&A motives than economic motives, e.g. 
personal motives. Third, accounting-based measures measure the overall firm performance, 
not the performance of single acquisitions. This becomes a notable drawback when firms are 
involved in more than one M&A transaction in a short period of time. Fourth, since there are 
many different accounting-based measures used in literature and empirical research, 
comparison among studies can be difficult. Fifth, the reliability of accounting-based measures 
is conditional on the quality of the annual financial statements of the firms, which in certain 
emerging markets can be considered unreliable. Finally, accounting standards may be 
different from country to country which raises concerns over the comparability of accounting 
data in cross-national studies (Brouthers, van Hastenburg and van den Ven, 1998; Chang, 
Witteloostuijn and Eden, 2010; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Hult et.al, 2008; Thanos and 
Papadakis, 2012; Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). 
2.3 Resource based view and strategic fit 
The general hypothesis of M&A success comes from Porter’s (1987) idea of strategic fit, that 
is the acquirer and the target should have similar strategies. However, Porter (1996) has also 
argued that since strategic position, which is all about diversifying the business strategy from 
the rivals, can easily be imitated by competitors strategic positioning may no longer be 
sufficient for competitive advantage but the key rather lies in operational strategic fit. The 
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strategic fit describes the importance of all activities inside the company matching the overall 
corporate strategy.  
According to resource based view (RBV), introduced by Barney (1991), firm’s competitive 
advantage lies in its resources. The RBV motivation for M&A’s is somewhat different from 
the classical synergy arguments. According to RBV some resources are more valuable to the 
company due to the fact that it can be difficult or impossible to imitate them, which creates 
competitive advantage. It has also been shown that similarities in resource allocations indicate 
similarities in strategies, hence resource allocations provide a rich base for the study of 
strategic fit between acquiring company and the target and the post-M&A performance 
outcomes (Beard and Dess, 1981; Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986). 
2.3.1 Synergy and similarities in resource allocations 
A common argument is that synergies are achieved through similarities in the business level 
operations of the target and the acquiring company (Ansoff, 1965). These similarities generate 
greater economies of both scale and scope and therefore acquisitions of companies with 
strategies similar to the ones of the acquirer are expected to create significant synergies and 
thus increase post-M&A performance (Harrison et.al., 1991). 
According to Wernerfelt (1984), RBV of company strategy suggests that merged firms with 
similar levels of resource allocations to certain areas can expect greater post-M&A 
performance in comparison to merged companies that are broadly different in resource 
allocation. Similar resource allocations may indicate similar distinctive competencies and/or 
similar dominant managerial logics (see e.g. Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Grant, 1988) 
Regardless of the popularity of the theory of strategic fit empirical evidence concerning 
relatedness and post-M&A performance is inconsistent. Several studies conclude that M&A’s 
completed to achieve relatedness between acquirer and target leads to higher performance. 
Kusewitt (1985) concluded that there exists a connection between similarities in industry and 
financial performance growth. Singh and Montgomery (1987) found that M&A’s that are 
related in terms of product, market and technique generate higher stock returns than unrelated 
M&A’s. According to Ramaswamy (1997) similarities in strategic characteristics, 
demonstrated by consistency in resource allocation patterns, have positive effect on post-
M&A performance. Others have reported different results. Elgers and Clark (1980) concluded 
that unrelated M&A’s generate higher stock returns, for both the acquiring company and the 
target, compared to related M&A’s. According to Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 
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(2008) both similarities and dissimilarities in strategic emphasis can increase value creation, 
but under varying M&A motives. Lubatkin (1987) and Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987) found 
that no particular form of relatedness generated greater financial post-M&A performance. 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) and Altunbas and Marqués (2008) both concluded that for some 
resource allocation factors similarities between the target and the acquirer generate increased 
post-M&A performance whilst for other factors dissimilarities increased performance. 
Finally, Harrison et.al. (1991) totally contradict the general hypothesis and propose that 
dissimilarities in resource allocation generate successful M&A’s in terms of post-M&A 
performance. 
2.3.2 Synergy and dissimilarities in resource allocations 
According to Barney (1988) synergies might be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient 
one, to increase value for the acquiring firm. He therefore proposes that unique and private 
dissimilarities between the target and the acquiring company may create more value than 
similarities. Unique means that the acquiring company will gain more from the synergies 
created through the transaction than other bidding companies and private means that the this 
advantage may only be known by the acquiring firm. In a bidding process the price of the 
target is based on publicly available information, but to one bidder, where unique 
dissimilarities are involved, the target is more valuable than to other bidders. 
Harrison et.al (1991) claim that uniquely valuable synergy is more likely to appear under 
dissimilarities than similarities in resource allocation, which is supported by the theory that 
dissimilarities in strategic characteristics or resource allocation suggest more value increase 
than by similarities (Barney, 1986).  
Due to similar strengths of the bidding companies they acquire similar targets (Porter, 1985). 
Therefore, similarities of the acquirer and the target imply common knowledge among 
potential bidders, created through competition. This common knowledge increases the 
chances of an auction and a bidding war. Dissimilarities in resource allocation however do not 
imply such common knowledge and thus a bid for a target that has different resource 
allocations than the bidder may not stir rivals to offer a similar bid and can therefore help 
avoidance of the winners curse problem (Harrison et.al., 1991; Varaiya, 1988). According to 
Barney (1988) dissimilarities in resource allocation may increase value creation through either 
information asymmetry between potential bidders or through uniquely valuable synergy that 
cannot be imitated by competitors of the bidder. Value creation from resource allocation 
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dissimilarities may also be associated with complementary competencies of the acquirer and 
the target, which enhances both learning and development of new capabilities (Harrison et.al, 
1991; 2001). 
Thus, there are contradicting arguments with respect to synergy creation through M&A’s, that 
is whether similarities or dissimilarities in resource allocation between the target and the 
acquirer are more appropriate for value creation and post-M&A performance. In this thesis 
these contradicting arguments are examined. 
2.4 Merger waves 
Merger waves are characterized as periods of high levels of merger activity followed by 
periods of relatively fewer transactions. According to research a combination of factors are 
considered to cause those waves, namely economic, regulatory and technological shocks. 
Economic growth stimulates companies to expand to meet the quickly increasing demand in 
the economy and M&A’s enables companies to grow faster than with internal, organic 
growth. Removal of regulatory barriers that might have prevented mergers can induce merger 
waves. Technological shocks can lead to changes in existing industries or even create new 
ones, which then again can trigger merger waves (Gaughan, 2002). 
According to economists and others five merger waves have taken place in the US since the 
1890s. However, there are different opinions about the exact start of the waves and their 
duration. The first wave is considered to have started sometime between 1893 and 1897 and 
then came to an end in 1904 with an introduction of antitrust laws. The second merger wave 
started between 1916 and 1919 and ended in 1929 with the stock market crash and the Great 
Depression. The main difference between the first and the second merger waves is considered 
to be that in the first wave the mergers were resulting in monopoly versus in the second wave 
they were resulting in oligopoly. The third merger wave, often called the conglomerate 
merger period, does not have as clear ending point as the first two waves. It is considered to 
have started somewhere between 1955 and 1965 and ended between 1969 and 1973, after the 
Tax Reform Act in 1969 followed by a crash of conglomerate stocks. The starting point of the 
fourth merger wave is, as of the third wave, not very exact. Commonly, it is considered to 
have started in 1984 although its antecedents are believed to stretch back to 1974. The fourth 
wave was characterized by hostile mergers and takeovers. The wave ended in 1989 when the 
expansion of the 1980s came to an end with collapse of the junk bond market, savings and 
loan banks and commercial banks’ loan portfolio and capital problems. The starting point of 
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the fifth wave is clearer than of the waves before where the numbers of M&A transactions 
started to rise again in 1992 starting a period of strategic mega-mergers that focused on more 
than quick financial gains. The fifth wave then came to an end in 2000 with the burst of the 
dot-com bubble (Gaughan, 2002; Lipton, 2006).  
In Europe M&A’s were not as common until in the 60’s with increased independence of 
economies. However the first truly European wave took place at a similar time as the fourth 
wave in the US, starting in 1987 with the number of domestic transactions tripling from 1986 
to 1989. The wave ended in 1991 with a recession in most European countries decreasing the 
volume of transactions considerably (Mariana, 2013). The next M&A wave in Europe started 
a little bit later than the fifth wave in the US, but in that wave M&A activity in Europe was on 
similar level as in the US. This was also the first truly global wave. The main drivers behind 
the increase in M&A’s in Europe in the 1990s are believed to be the adoption of the Euro, the 
globalization process, technological innovation, deregulation and privatization, and the boom 
in financial markets (Mariana, 2013; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). 
Gaughan (2011) and others have claimed that the relatively short but intensive period of 
2003-2007 can be considered as the sixth merger wave, which was truly globalized. This 
period is characterized by low interest rates which fuelled international speculative bubble in 
real estate and stock markets. Due to the low interest rates leveraged acquisitions became less 
expensive which expanded the activities of private equity firms which fuelled the demand for 
M&A targets. The sixth wave then came to a rapid end when the subprime crisis started in 
2007. 
In M&A waves there is a tendency for companies to overinvest in M&A’s since it is 
important to not fall behind and possibly be overtaken. That can lead to bad investments that 
do not generate synergies. As a result, studies done using a sample in M&A waves might be 
biased by those inefficient investments, compared to studies that use samples from 
conservative time periods (Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008). 
2.5 Corporate governance systems 
Corporate governance is a relatively new term, first used approximately twenty years ago. 
However, the theories underlying the concept of corporate governance and the areas it 
involves are much older and come from different fields of studies, including finance, 
economics, accounting, law, management and organizational behavior. The main theories that 
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have been associated with the development of corporate governance are; agency theory, 
separation of ownership and control, transaction cost economics and stewardship theory. The 
development of corporate governance is global and is therefore an intricate area including 
structural differences such as legal, cultural and ownership. Consequently, some theories 
underlying corporate governance may be more relevant in some countries than others, 
depending on what stage of the development a country, or group of countries, is at (Mallin, 
2013).  
There is a disagreement on which corporate governance mechanisms are good and which are 
bad. By many, US and UK, along with Germany and Japan, are considered to have the best 
corporate governance systems in the world and the differences between them are believed to 
be relatively small compared to their differences from other countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
Corporate governance is often divided into the Anglo-American model and the Continental 
European model. The Anglo-American model is characterized by financing through equity, 
dispersed ownership, active markets for corporate control, and flexible labor markets whereas 
the Continental European model is defined by long-term debt financing, large blockholders’ 
ownership, usually an individual or a family, weak markets for corporate control and stiff 
labor markets (Becht and Röell, 1999; Berglöf, 1991; Hall and Soskice, 2001; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
US markets are well developed and have a diversified shareholder base that includes both 
institutional investors and individuals. But US also suffers from many of the agency problems 
associated with the separation of ownership and control. Not having a specific governance 
code as many other countries makes the US unusual to some extent. Over the years there have 
been various state and federal developments in corporate governance. However, some 
developments have indicated national developments (Mallin, 2013). 
Corporate governance in the UK is more related to the US than to the rest of Europe. Markets 
in the UK are, like in the US, well developed and with a diversified shareholder base (Mallin, 
2013). Although corporate governance structure in the UK and the US are similar in many 
ways there are also some differences, e.g. ownership is less engaged in the US than in the UK, 
dual leadership is common in the UK and rare in the US and there are stronger regulations in 
the US, like hostile takeover regulation (Aguilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp, 2006; Toms 
and Wright, 2005). Compared to US and UK, companies in Continental Europe are 
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characterized by weaker investor protection, less developed capital markets and more 
concentrated ownership structure where owners are more able to exercise direct control and 
can thus operate in context with fewer market-oriented rules for disclosure (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et.al, 1998). 
The main difference between corporate governance systems in the US and Europe, especially 
continental Europe, is that in the US the market oriented shareholder perspective is dominant 
whereas the market is network oriented in Europe. In US the focus is on short-term returns 
and maximization of shareholder value where the ownership is dispersed. In Europe on the 
other hand there are few controlling owners, often a family, that focus more on a long-term 
investment perspective (Clarke, 2007; Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008). On average, firms with 
few controlling owners are better managed than firms with dispersed ownership since 
concentrated ownership lessens the chance of agency problem because the controlling owner 
and the manager are often the same person, especially in family-controlled firms (Enriques 
and Volpin, 2007). 
The influence of corporate governance on M&A performance has not received a great deal of 
academic research (Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey, 2007). To the author’s notice no 
theoretical papers, on the effects of different corporate governance structures on M&A 
performance, have been published. However, empirical studies on M&A performance have 
found different results depending on the geographical area the studies are conducted in, which 
could, at least partly, be attributable to different corporate governance systems. Harrison et.al 
(1991) and Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) conducted a similar study in the US and Europe, 
respectively, where Harrison et.al found that dissimilarities in resource allocation have 
positive effect on post-M&A performance but Ritterfeldt and Trygg found more mixed 
results, where depending on the resources either similarities or dissimilarities in resource 
allocation positively affect M&A performance. Trying to explain these inconsistent results 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg suggested that it might be more difficult in Europe, than in the US, to 
merge with a company with different resource allocations since resource allocation difference 
might be larger in Europe, even too large, creating dis-synergies which can prevent the 
possible skill and efficiency transfer. Further, Ritterfeldt and Trygg suggest that differences in 
resource allocation rather have positive effect on M&A performance in the US whilst the 
effects are negative in Europe suggesting that similarities, rather than dissimilarities, increase 
post-M&A performance in Europe. However, not all previous empirical studies support the 
idea of Ritterfeldt and Trygg, that different corporate governance systems have different 
Creation of post-M&A performance: Similarities versus dissimilarities in resource allocation 
15 
 
effects on post-M&A performance. Ramaswamy (1997) and Altunbas and Marqués (2008) 
studied post-M&A performance of banks in the US and Europe, respectively where 
Ramaswamy concluded that similarties in resource allocation increase post-M&A 
performance whilst the results of Altunbas and Marqués were in line with the results of 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg, that is mixed results.  
Thus, giving the lack of academic research on corporate governance and M&A performance 
and inconsistent results of empirical results under same corporate governance it is difficult to 
conclude what effects corporate governance structure has on post-M&A performance. This 
gives an opportunity for further research in the future to gain a better understanding of M&A 
performance and what enhances the possibility of successful M&A’s. 
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3. Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis is based on a study by Harrison et.al. (1991) and a thesis by 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008). The dataset consists of longitudinal data, that is for each set of 
companies the performance is measured at two points in time; the combined performance of 
the acquirer and the target before the M&A transaction, and then again the performance of the 
merged company after the transaction. 
The thesis uses deductive approach to tests some contradicting arguments from previous 
studies of resource allocation and post-M&A performance. Multiple linear regression analysis 
is then used to determine the exact relationship between the explanatory variables chosen and 
post-M&A performance. 
3.1 Multiple linear regression 
Classical linear regression (CLR) describes the relationship between a dependent variable and 
one or more explanatory variables and an error term, that is the CLR explains how 
movements in variables affect movements in another variable. The multiple linear regression 
(MLR), shown in equation 3.1, is an extension of the CLR, where changes in the dependent 
variable are explained by two or more explanatory variables (Brooks, 2008). 
Equation 3.1: Multiple linear regression 
1 1 2 2 k ky x x x         
The most commonly used method to estimate linear regressions is ordinary least squares 
(OLS) which fits a line through the regression points so that that the sum of squared error 
terms is minimized. However, for the OLS estimator to be the best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE) the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem, presented below, need to hold 
(Brooks, 2008; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Thomas, 1997). 
Assumption I - Error terms have zero mean. The average value of the error terms is 
assumed to be zero,   0iE   . However, this assumption is never violated as long there is a 
constant included in the regression model.  
Assumption II - Homoscedasticity. The variance of the error terms is assumed to be constant 
and finite for all sets of explanatory variables,   2var i  . If the error terms do not have 
constant variance, it is said that they are heteroscedastic. A common test for heteroscedasticity 
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is White’s test. If heteroscedasticity is present in the error terms the standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates will be wrong and hence statistical inferences based on those standard 
errors will be wrong. To correct for heteroscedasticity it is common to use White‘s robust 
standard errors, which for errors that are positively related to the squares of the explanatory 
variables the standard errors are increased which requires more evidence against the null 
hypothesis before it can be rejected. 
Assumption III - No autocorrelation. The covariance between error terms is assumed to be 
zero, cov( , ) 0i j   . For cross-sectional data there is usually no autocorrelation present, 
whilst autocorrelation is quite common problem in time series analysis. A commonly used test 
for detecting autocorrelation is the Breusch-Godfrey test that tests jointly for up to rth order 
autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is present Newey-West standard errors can be used, but 
they correct for both autocorrelation and hetersoscedasticity by adjusting the standard errors 
in a similar way as the White’s robust standard errors. Assumption  IV - Non-stochastic 
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables and the error terms are assumed to be 
independent, or exogeneous, cov( , ) 0i ix  . If the explanatory variables are correleated with 
the error term, the OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. This results from the 
estimator assigning explanatory power to the variables when actually the explanatory power 
arises from the correlation between the error term and the dependent variable. When the 
problem of endogeneity is present the regression estimates only measure the magnitude of the 
relationship between the variables but not the direction of causation. The use of instrumental 
variables provides a way to obtain consistent parameter estimates when dealing with the 
endogeneity problem.  
To be able to make valid inferences about the population parameters from the sample 
parameters a fifth assumption in required. 
Assumption V - Normality. The error terms are normally distributed,  20,N  . Even 
though economic and financial data is often non-normally distributed this assumption 
generally holds for sufficiently large samples. The most common test for normality is the 
Bera-Jarque (BJ) test which determines the skewness and excess kurtosis of the distribution, 
whereas the normal distribution has no skewness and kurtosis of three. For large data samples, 
the violation of this assumption has insignificant effect due to Central Limit Theorem which 
states that test statistics asymptotically follow the appropriate distribution, even if the error 
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terms are not normally distributed. However, if the error terms do not follow a normal 
distribution in small samples the estimated parameters will not follow a normal distribution 
which complicates the parameter interpretation (Brooks, 2008). 
Finally, when estimating a regression using OLS an assumption about no multicollinearity has 
to be made. This assumption indicates that none of the explanatory variables are perfectly 
correlated with one another. However, this assumption does not imply that the explanatory 
variables can‘t be correlated in any way, just that they can‘t be in an exact relationship with 
one another. If the explanatory variables are highly correlated it is not possible to estimate all 
of the model‘s coefficients separately and the regression estimation yields a high R2 value, 
even when the explanatory variables are not statistically significant. Another problem that 
appears in the presence of multicollinearity, is that when adding or removing variables from 
the regression model causes the coefficient estimates to change intensely. A way to detect 
multicollinearity is to conduct a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables and check 
whether there is a high correlation between any of them. A number of estimation techniques 
have been proposed that are valid in the presence of multicollinearity, e.g. principal 
components. Many researchers have however argued against those techniques as they can be 
complex and their properties are not as well understood as those of the OLS estimator. 
Further, many econometrics have argued that multicollinearity is more of a problem with the 
data than the model or estimation method and have thus proposed more ad hoc methods, such 
as ignoring the problem, drop one of the collinear variables, transform the correlated variables 
into a ratio to use instead of the variables separately or try to increase the size of the dataset 
by collecting more data (Brooks, 2008; Wooldridge, 2003). 
3.2 Data collection 
The data on M&A transactions is collected through the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, for 
the time period 2003-2007, which is the latest merger wave. Then the dataset is further 
restricted by implantation of the following restrictions: 
1. To make the results comparable to the contradicting results of previous studies only 
transactions where the acquirer is registered in the United States (US) or Europe is 
chosen. 
2. Only M&A’s where the acquirer obtained majority of the control, that is 50% or 
more, are taken into account. Transactions where only minority of the control is 
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acquired are not assumed to have significant effect on performance and are therefore 
ignored. 
3. To eliminate small targets and transactions both acquiring and target companies are 
restricted to public companies since those companies are believed to be of significant 
size and importance and thus having influence on the post performance. Since annual 
reports of public companies are supposed to be publicly available this restriction 
should ensure availability of the variables needed.  
4. M&A transactions that were classified as investments or reorganizations are excluded 
from the sample since the goals of these transactions are in a way different, that is no 
significant synergy effects are expected.  
5. To be able to allocate the performance change to a specific M&A transaction both 
acquirers and targets involved in more than one transaction during the study period 
are eliminated from the sample. Companies that engaged in any other M&A 
transactions three years before and/or after are the transaction are eliminated for the 
same reason. It can be claimed that three years is not enough time for synergies to 
fully emerge but the time frame had to be limited to get large enough sample size 
since a relative amount of the companies were involved in other transactions beyond 
the three year time frame (Ramaswamy, 1997; Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008). 
After those restrictions have been implemented the data sample consists of 186 M&A 
transactions, 128 from the US and 58 from Europe. For the companies involved in those 
transactions the income statements and balance sheets, available from S&P Capital IQ, are 
gathered. Although the dataset is restricted to only public companies the finance statements 
were not available for all the 128 transactions. In some cases the merged company went 
bankrupt shortly after the merger whilst in other cases the finance statements were not 
available due to unknown reasons. As a result, the final sample consists of 86 M&A 
transactions, 55 from the US and 31 from Europe. List of the companies that compose the 
final sample can be found in Appendix A. Microsoft Office Excel is then used to calculate the 
dependent and explanatory variables, described below, using the relevant numbers from the 
companies’ annual statements. 
3.3 Dependent variable 
Like discussed earlier M&A performance can be evaluated using number of measures which 
can be divided in to three groups; shareholder return, financial performance, or accounting-
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based measures, and product market performance. The almost endless possibilities to measure 
M&A performance have been mentioned as a factor for inconsistencies in results of empirical 
researches of M&A’s. Comparison of studies that use different measures has also been found 
difficult (Meglio and Risberg, 2011).  
Previous studies of M&A and resource allocation have used different accounting-based ratios 
as a measure of performance. However it seems that ROA is the most commonly used 
accounting-based measure where Harrison et.al (1991), Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) and 
Ramaswamy (1997) all used ROA as performance measure whilst Altunbas and Marqués 
(2008) used ROE. Since this study is a replication of previous studies by Harrison et.al and 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg, this study uses the same dependent variable as those replicated studies, 
namely, the change in ROA. This will also make it more appropriate to compare the results of 
the study to those of the replicated ones. 
The change in ROA is calculated according to Equation 3.2 below. 
Equation 3.2: Calculation of dependent variable, ROA  
 5 1 1merged Acquirer Targett t tROA ROA ROA ROA       
Following Harrison’s et.al. (1991) assumptions, it is suggested that up to five years is a 
reasonable time for the M&A transaction to become successful and create synergies. 
Therefore the post-M&A performance is measured five years after the M&A transaction, 
using the merged company’s ROA. The pre-M&A performance is based on the combined 
ROA from the acquiring company and the target company from the companies’ last annual 
report before the M&A announcement. The use of last annual report before M&A 
announcement instead of before the transaction itself can be explained by an argument from 
Coffee, Lowenstein, and Rose-Ackerman (1988) that the companies might take on some 
defensive actions, especially for hostile takeovers, after the announcement that can affect the 
annual reports. 
3.4 Explanatory variables and hypotheses 
In their study, Harrison et.al. (1991) use resource allocation on capital intensity, 
administrative intensity, interest intensity, and R&D intensity as explanatory variables. Those 
variables are chosen due to the fact that they refer to allocations that strategic managers can 
significantly influence and that each resource has strategic implications. Ritterfeldt and Trygg 
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(2008) further extended the set of explanatory variables, using variables that, at least in some 
way, reflect management strategic intention. These variables are; cost of goods sold, financial 
items, inventories, current assets, working capital, property, plant and equipment, long-term 
debt and employees. Out of those explanatory variables, financial items and employees were 
found to be statistically insignificant. To test whether there is a relationship between resource 
allocation, corporate culture and post-M&A performance they also added the control 
variables, industry and country as corporate culture measurements (van Oudenhoven and van 
der Zee, 2002; Teerikangas and Very, 2006). Based on those previous studies and their results 
the following variables are chosen as explanatory variables for this study: 
 Capital intensity 
 Cost of goods sold 
 Current assets 
 Interest expense 
 Inventories 
 Long-term debt 
 Property, plant and equipment 
 Selling, general and administrative expenses 
 Working capital 
 Industry  
 Country 
Below, definitions of the variables are given as well as motivations for their use together with 
their related hypotheses tested. 
Capital intensity (CI) refers to the assets needed to keep the current revenue, where assets 
are the economic resources owned and controlled by the company that will generate future 
revenue (Palepu, Healy, Bernandr and Peek, 2007). CI is heavily related with the company’s 
industry (Bartels et.al, 2006). According to Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) dissimilarities in CI 
between the acquiring company and the target company allow for efficiency improvements 
with better utilization of assets. On the other hand, Porter’s (1987) of strategic fit indicates 
that similarities in CI should create better synergies and thus increase post-M&A 
performance. Weiguo and Ming (2008) also argue that dissimilarities could result in 
inefficiency transfer and thus decrease performance. 
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Equation 3.3: CI 
AssetsCI
Revenue
  
CI H0: Dissimilarities in CI values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
CI H1: Similarities in CI values of the acquiring company and the target company have 
positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
Cost of goods sold (COGS) refers to costs related to the production of goods (and/or service) 
sold and measures the company’s production efficiency (Palepu et.al, 2007). According to 
Chandler (1990) dissimilarities between the acquirer’s and the target’s COGS values increases 
the bargain power for one company, if the companies offer similar products or services. Even 
though the companies offer different products or services synergies can be expected through 
economies of scope. However, according to Altunbas and Marqués (2008) integrating 
companies with different cost structures can be difficult, especially in the short term, resulting 
in negative effects on post-M&A performance. 
Equation 3.4: COGS  
Revenue GrossProfitCOGS
Revenue
   
COGS H0: Dissimilarities in COGS values of the acquiring company and the target 
company have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
COGS H1: Similarities in COGS values of the acquiring company and the target 
company have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
Current assets (CA) refers to short term assets that are expected to be liquidated within a 
year, e.g. cash holdings, accounts receivable and inventory (Palepu et.al, 2007). Ritterfeldt 
and Trygg (2008) state that dissimilarities in CA, between the acquiring company and the 
target company, indicate that either of the companies is more efficient than the other and due 
to skill and efficiency transfer positive effects on post-M&A transfer should be expected. On 
the other hand, the more efficient company could in the same way adopt the inefficiency from 
the less efficient firm, resulting in negative effects on post-M&A performance, indicating that 
similarities in CA would rather increase performance (Weiguo and Ming, 2008). 
Equation 3.5: CA  
CurrentAssetsCA
Assets
  
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CA H0: Dissimilarities in CA values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
CA H1: Similarities in CA values of the acquiring company and the target company have 
positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
Interest expense (IE) can be defined as the cost of debt and defines by a large extent the debt 
capacity (Harrison et.al., 1991). Both the companies’ use of debt and unused debt capacity 
can be defined as resource (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Donaldson, 1961). According to 
Harrison et.al (1991) dissimilarities in interest expense are positively related to post-M&A 
performance due to complementary synergies. On the other hand, according to Porter’s (1987) 
idea of strategic fit and Weiguo and Ming’s (2008) argument of inefficiency transfer, 
similarities in IE should rather increase post-M&A performance. 
Equation 3.6: IE 
InterestExpenseIE
Revenue
  
IE H0: Dissimilarities in IE values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
IE H1: Similarities in IE values of the acquiring company and the target company have 
positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
Inventories (INV) is the combined value of raw materials, work in progress and finished 
goods that the possessed by the company (Palepu, et.al). This value, the amount of capital tied 
up in inventories, should be minimal (Stevenson, 2006). As for CA it can be argued that 
dissimilarities result in skill and efficiency transfer and therefore positive effects on post-
M&A performance (Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008) or in the same way, inefficiency transfer 
resulting in negative effects on performance (Weiguo and Ming, 2008). 
Equation 3.7: INV  
InventoriesINV
Assets
  
INV H0: Dissimilarities in INV values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
INV H1: Similarities in INV values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
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Long-term debt (LTD), which often is secured with long-term assets like PPE, refers to the 
company’s leverage and to what extent the company finances its operations (Palepu et.al, 
2007). In most cases LTD is cheapest way for a company to finance its operations (Pike and 
Neale, 1993). Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) state that if there are dissimilarities in LTD of the 
acquirer and the target company the merged company can allocate the debt in the most 
favorable way, due to efficiency transfer. However, according to Porter’s (1987) idea of 
strategic fit and Weiguo and Ming (2008) argument of inefficiency transfer, similarities in 
LTD should rather increase post-M&A performance. 
Equation 3.8: LTD 
LongTermDebtLTD
Assets
  
LTD H0: Dissimilarities in LTD values of the acquiring company and the target 
company have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
LTD H1: Similarities in LTD values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
Property, plant and equipment (PPE) refers to fixed long-term assets that are illiquid. 
Those assets are associated with low risk but due to large amount of tied up capital they 
should be minimized to achieve the highest ROA (Palepu et.al, 2007). According to 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) dissimilarities in PPE indicate that the less efficient company can 
adopt practices from the more efficient company and thus downsize its assets having positive 
effect on post-M&A performance. On the contrary, transfer of inefficiency could have 
negative effect on performance indicating that similarities would rather increase post-M&A 
performance (Weiguo and Ming, 2008). 
Equation 3.9: PPE 
, &Property Plant EquipmentPPE
Assets
  
PPE H0: Dissimilarities in PPE values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
PPE H1: Similarities in PPE values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
Selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) (or overhead) refers to costs related to 
overhead activities such as marketing and administrative work. According to Harrison et.al 
(1991) dissimilarities in SGA values of the acquirer and the target have positive effect on 
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post-M&A performance due to complementary competencies. On the other hand, according to 
Ramaswamy (1997) dissimilarities in operational efficiency (measured by overheads to 
revenues) have negative effect on post-M&A performance.  
Equation 3.10 SGA  
SGAexpensesSGA
Revenue
  
SGA H0: Dissimilarities in SGA values of the acquiring company and the target 
company have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
SGA H1: Similarities in SGA values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
Working capital (WC) represents the liquidity of the company, that is, current assets 
exceeding current liabilities. For companies to be able to operate they need to invest a certain 
amount in working capital (Palepu et.al, 2007). The same arguments can be asserted for WC 
as for CA and INV, whereas dissimilarities in WC can result in either efficiency transfer 
(Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008) or inefficiency transfer (Weiguo and Ming, 2008). 
Equation 3.11: WC 
CurrentAssets CurrentLiabilitiesWC
Assets
  
WC H0: Dissimilarities in WC values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
WC H1: Similarities in WC values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance (ROA) 
According to van Oudenhoven and van der Zee (2002) dissimilarities in corporate culture, 
between the target and the acquirer, result in increase in post-M&A performance. That is, 
amongst other, based on Barney’s (1988) notion that cross border M&A’s allows companies 
to access new strategic resources and should therefore be successful. Others have blamed 
cultural differences for the high failure rate of M&A’s (see e.g. Chatterjee, Lubatkin, 
Schweiger and Weber, 1992; Nahavandi and Makekzadeh, 1988; Weber 1996). Following 
Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008), the control variables industry and country, are used as proxies 
for corporate culture to allow for quantification and measure. 
Industry (IND) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the acquiring company and the 
target company operate in different industries and 0 if they are in similar industries.  
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IND H0: Acquiring company and target company belonging to different industries 
increases post-M&A performance 
IND H1: Acquiring company and target company belonging to similar industries 
increases post-M&A performance 
Country (COU) is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the acquirer and the target are 
registered in different countries and 0 if they are registered in the same country.  
IND H0: Acquiring company and target company registered in different countries 
increases post-M&A performance 
IND H1: Acquiring company and target company registered in the same country 
increases post-M&A performance 
Geographical Area (AREA) is a dummy variable used to separate the total sample into two 
subsamples, the US and Europe. The variable takes the value 1 if the acquiring company is 
registered in the US and 0 if the acquirer is located in Europe. 
All the explanatory variables, except the three dummy variables, are in the absolute difference 
between the acquiring company and the target, based on the companies’ last annual report 
before the M&A announcement. Equation 3.12 gives an example of how the variables are 
calculated and CI is then replaced for the other explanatory variables. 
Equation 3.12: Calculation of explanatory variables 
g
g
1 1
acquirer tar et
acquirer tar et
t t
Assets AssetsCI CI CI
Revenue Revenue 
              
Finally, the study’s regression equation, defined in Equation 3.13, is estimated using Eviews. 
Equation 3.13: Regression equation 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
ROA CI COGS CA IE INV LTD
PPE SGA WC IND COU
      
     
       
     
 
3.5 Methodology criticism 
Firstly, the data sample at hand is rather small since it only includes companies that were 
involved in an M&A transaction in the sixth merger wave, from 2003 to 2007, and the 
acquirer is registered in either the US or Europe. Since the data is solely gathered from S&P 
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Capital IQ the sample size is further decreased due to unavailability of the annual statements 
for part of the companies involved, for unknown reasons. Unfortunately a small dataset can 
cause some empirical problems and diminishes the validity of the results. 
Secondly, since some restrictions were applied on the dataset the results may be affected by 
sample selection bias which occurs when non-randomly selected samples, where subsets of 
the data are systematically excluded, are used in a study. When sample selection bias is 
present it can distort the results and affect the statistical significance of tests (Heckman, 
1979). 
Finally, the explanatory variables CI and PPE only consider assets that are owned and 
controlled by the firm and does not include any off-balance financing such as leasing. 
Companies’ preference for off-balance has a large impact on these variables, but it also affects 
ROA. Therefore it can be argued to be questionable to use ROA as a performance measure 
when it can be increased by choosing to use off-balance financing. However, it is unlikely that 
the studied companies would change their financing strategy dramatically during the years 
between the performance measurements and thus the impacts on change in ROA should not 
be significant (Ritterfeldt and Trygg, 2008). 
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4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of both the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables, except for the dummy variables1. As can be seen, the variables are different in size, 
where especially CI is a great deal larger than the other variables. When variables differ much 
in size it is often preferred to standardize the variables to make their scale irrelevant and make 
the interpretation of the coefficient slopes easier. Using standardized variables does not 
however affect the regression’s statistical significance and probabilities which makes the 
results comparable with studies that use unstandardized variables (Woolridge, 2005). 
Therefore, all the dependent variables are standardized according to Equation 4.1. 
Equation 4.1: Standardized variables 
*
ˆ
i
y
y yy 
  
The data is also tested for the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem. Like stated in 
Chapter 3.1 the assumption of the error terms having a zero mean is never violated as long as 
there is a constant included in the regression model, as is the case in this study. The second 
assumption, the assumption of homoscedasticity, is tested using a White’s test. According to 
the results of the White’s test, found in Appendix B, the H0 of homoscedasticity cannot be 
rejected, indicating that the problem of heteroscedasticity is not present. Even though 
autocorrelation is usually not present in cross-sectional data the assumption of no 
                                                 
1 The dummy variables are IND, COU and AREA. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
 Mean Median Std. dev. 
Dependent variable    
ΔROA 0.13458 -0.01736 1.14905 
Explanatory variables    
CI 12.11829 0.96979 72.81668 
COGS 0.20431 0.03466 0.74157 
CA 0.18233 0.07068 0.31713 
IE 0.33433 0.00900 1.86965 
INV 0.03416 0.00263 0.07847 
LTD 0.60745 0.10046 3.51774 
PPE 0.14174 0.03758 0.31709 
SGA 0.73768 0.10471 3.89958 
WC 0.43555 0.12096 1.63246 
Creation of post-M&A performance: Similarities versus dissimilarities in resource allocation 
29 
 
autocorrelation, up to the 10th order, is tested using Breusch-Godfrey test. Appendix C shows 
the results of the Breusch-Godfrey test, where it can be seen that the H0 of no autocorrelation 
cannot be rejected which indicates that the error terms are not correlated. To test the fourth 
assumption, the assumption of non-stochastic explanatory variables, it is tested whether the 
covariance between the error term and each of the dependent variables is equal to zero. In 
Table 4.2 it can be seen that the covariance between the error term (e) and each of the 
explanatory variables is equal to zero, indicating that all the explanatory variables are 
exogenous or stochastic. 
 
The last assumption, the assumption of normality is tested using a Bera-Jarque test. The test’s 
results are shown in Appendix D. It can be seen from the results that we reject the H0 of 
normally distributed error terms. As mentioned earlier this can complicate the parameter 
inference since the data sample is relatively small and therefore the parameters have to be 
interpreted with caution. 
A correlation matrix of the explanatory variables is used to determine whether the assumption 
of no multicollinearity holds. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 4.3. It can be seen    
Table 4.2: Covariance between error term (e) and explanatory variables 
   Covariance 
cov(e,CI)  = 0.00 
cov(e,COGS) = 0.00 
cov(e,CA)  = 0.00 
cov(e,IE)  = 0.00 
cov(e,INV) = 0.00 
cov(e,LTD) = 0.00 
cov(e,PPE) = 0.00 
cov(e,SGA) = 0.00 
cov(e,WC) = 0.00
Table 4.3: Correlation matrix 
  CI COGS CA IE INV LTD PPE SGA WC IND COU AREA 
CI 1            
COGS 0.010 1           
CA -0.039 0.105 1          
IE 0.980 0.056 -0.004 1         
INV -0.055 -0.026 0.054 -0.054 1        
LTD -0.019 -0.005 0.789 -0.002 -0.042 1       
PPE -0.041 0.102 0.671 -0.021 -0.062 0.800 1      
SGA 0.982 0.070 -0.021 0.965 -0.040 -0.015 -0.025 1     
WC -0.012 0.034 0.859 0.015 -0.043 0.973 0.807 -0.004 1    
IND -0.091 -0.057 0.241 -0.056 0.114 0.130 0.224 -0.072 0.160 1   
COU -0.036 -0.010 0.047 -0.015 0.094 -0.050 -0.008 -0.050 -0.054 0.125 1  
AREA 0.081 0.045 -0.108 0.074 0.028 0.075 -0.035 0.081 0.082 -0.228 -0.327 1 
Highly correlated variables are marked in bold 
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that none of the explanatory variables are perfectly correlated2. However, some of the 
variables are highly correlated (marked in bold), with correlation coefficient higher than 0.8 
which indicated a problem of near multicollinearity. Like mentioned in Chapter 3.1, near 
multicollinearity is often said to be more of a problem with the data than with the model, that 
is the data set contains insufficient information to obtain estimates for all the coefficients 
separately (Brooks, 2008). Due to the limited data set at hand the possibility of collecting 
more data is not available in this case. Even though near multicollinearity is present the 
BLUE properties of the OLS estimator are not affected, that is it will still be consistent, 
unbiased and efficient. However, near multicollinearity makes the confidence intervals for the 
parameters very wide and significance tests might therefore give inappropriate conclusions 
and thus, make it difficult to make sharp inferences (Brooks, 2008).  
4.2 Empirical results 
The empirical results of this study are presented in Table 4.4. In the first column all 86 
observations, from both the US and Europe, are used. Out of the explanatory variables, none 
are statistically significant at the 1% significance level, although Capital intensity (CI) and 
Property, plant and equipment (PPE) are statistically significant at the 5% significance level, 
and Interest expense (IE) and Working capital (WC) are statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level. Other explanatory variables do not have significant effect on the change in 
Return on assets (ROA).  
The dummy variable AREA, which takes the value 1 if the acquirer is located in the US and 0 
if the aqcuirer is located in Europe, is not statistically significant. That indicates that there is 
no difference between the samples from the US and Europe. Even so, the two samples, the 55 
observations from the US and the 31 observations from Europe, are also estimated separately. 
The second column if Table 4.4 shows the empirical results for US whilst the empirical 
results for Europe can be found in the third column of the same table. As can be seen, the 
results for the US and Europe are somewhat different in regards of significance and signs, 
even though the insignificance of the AREA variable indicates that there is no difference. 
 
                                                 
2 Variables are perfectly correlated if the correlation coefficient is equal to one. 
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For the US, only Property, plant and equipment (PPE) is significant at the 1% significance 
level, Interest expense (IE) and Working capital (WC) are significant at the 5% significance 
level and Selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) is significant at the 10% 
significance level. For Europe on the other hand Cost of goods sold (COGS) and Selling, 
general and administrative expenses (SGA) are significant at the 1% significance level and 
Interest expense is significant at the 10% significance level. In Chapter 4.3 the statistically 
significant explanatory variables are analyzed further in regards of theory and previous 
researches. Since the other variables do not provide statistical evidence of their influence on 
the change on return on assets (ROA) they cannot be analyzed any further. However, due to 
the apparent problem of multicollinearity the following analysis must be taken with caution 
since the significance test might give inappropriate results which then makes is harder to draw 
firm conclusions. 
4.3 Analysis 
The signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables indicate whether similarities or 
dissimilarities in resource allocation, in the given variable, generate a positive effect on the 
post-M&A performance, ROA. Negative coefficients imply that similarities generate positive 
change in ROA whilst positive coefficients imply that dissimilarities in resource allocation 
positively affect post-M&A ROA. 
Table 4.4: Empirical results 
 All  US  Europe  
C 0.0585  0.2062 *** 0.0894  
CI -0.8830 ** 0.3264  -1.6833  
COGS -0.0453  0.0318  -1.3192 *** 
CA 0.0214  0.0542  0.1369  
IE 0.4665 * 0.6390 ** 1.5837 * 
INV -0.0633  -0.0508  0.0135  
LTD 0.3148  0.0252  -0.0405  
PPE 0.1898 ** 0.3115 *** 0.0785  
SGA 0.4463  -0.9513 * 1.3653 *** 
WC 0.5634 * 0.7244 ** -0.6291  
IND -0.0339  0.0194  -0.2651  
COU 0.0068  -0.2585  -0.0735  
AREA 0.1403          
R2 0.8778   0.9533   0.5871 
*** Significant at 1% significance level 
** Significant at 5% significance level 
* Significant at 10% significance level 
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Capital intensity (CI) is statistically insignificant for both the US and Europe separately. 
However, for the whole sample CI is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The 
coefficient is -0.8830 for each standard deviation difference in CI which implies that one 
standard deviation in difference between the acquirer and the target CI increases post-M&A 
performance by 0.8830 standard deviations of ROA. This supports the H0 hypothesis that 
dissimilarities in CI values of the acquiring company and the target company have positive 
effect on post-M&A performance. This result is in line with Harrison et.al. (1991) which 
concluded that uniquely valuable synergy is more likely to appear under dissimilarities in 
resource allocation.  
Cost of goods sold (COGS) is not statistically significant for the US, but significant at the 1% 
significance level for Europe. The slope of the coefficient is -1.3192 for each standard 
deviation difference in COGS. This implies that one standard deviation in difference between 
the acquirer and the target COGS generates a negative effect on the post-M&A ROA by 
1.3192 standard deviations of ROA. This supports the H1 hypothesis that similarities in 
COGS values of the acquiring company and the target company have positive effect on post-
M&A performance, which is further supported by results of Altunbas and Marqués (2008). 
They concluded that different cost structures could induce difficulties in mergers, especially 
in the short-term, that could cause post-M&A performance to drop. Even though the dummy 
variable, AREA, is found insignificant there is a difference in the results between the US and 
Europe, when estimated separately. Despite the fact that the results have to be taken with 
caution these results might be associated with the difference in corporate governance systems. 
As Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) argued, corporate governance systems in Europe are more 
heterogeneous than in the US, which might make it more difficult to merge with a company 
with different resource allocations and thus differences in COGS are more likely have 
negative effect on post-M&A performance in Europe. 
Current assets (CA) is statistically insignificant for both the US and Europe, as well as the 
whole sample. The effects of CA on change in ROA can therefore not be analyzed further. 
However, according to these results, it seems reasonable to assume that neither similarities 
nor dissimilarities in CA, between acquirer and target, affect post-M&A performance. 
However, Ramaswamy (1997), Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) and others have found that 
similarities in CA have a positive effect on post-M&A performance. 
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Interest expense (IE) is statistically significant at the 5% significance level for the US and at 
the 10% level for Europe. For both samples the coefficient is positive, 0.6390 for the US and 
1.5837 for Europe. This indicates that for the US each standard deviation in the difference 
between IE of the acquirer and the target increases post-M&A performance by 0.6390 
standard deviations of ROA whilst the increase is higher for Europe where post-M&A ROA 
increases by 1.5837 standard deviations of ROA for each standard deviation in the difference 
between the acquirer and the target. The positive coefficients for both samples supports the H0 
hypothesis that dissimilarities in IE values of the acquiring company and the target company 
have positive effect on post-M&A performance. This result is further supported by the theory 
of complementary synergies and previous research by Harrison et.al (1991). 
Both Inventories (INV) and Long-term debt (LTD) are statistically insignificant for both the 
US and Europe, as well as for the whole sample. As for CA, the effects of INV and LTD 
cannot be analyzed further although it seems reasonable to conclude that neither similarities 
nor dissimilarities in acquirer’s and target’s INV and LTD values has any effect on post-
M&A performance. In previous research by Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008), dissimilarities were 
found to have positive effect on post-M&A ROA, for both INV and LTD. 
Property, plant and equipment (PPE) is statistically significant at the 1% significance level for 
the US but not statistically significant for Europe. The coefficient is positive, taking a value of 
0.3115 for each standard deviation difference in PPE, implying that for each standard 
deviation in the difference between the companies’ PPE increases post-M&A ROA by 0.3115 
standard deviations of ROA. This supports the H0 hypothesis that dissimilarities in PPE 
values of the acquiring company and the target company have positive effect on post-M&A 
performance, which results from efficiency transfer. This result is not found to have support 
from previous researches. Different results for the US and Europe can possibly be attributable 
to different governance structures. As mentioned earlier it might induce more difficulties for 
companies in Europe to merge with a company with different resource allocations than for US 
companies and thus dissimilarities in resource allocation might presumably create larger 
economies of scope in the US and therefore have a positive effect on post-M&A ROA.  
Selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA) is statistically significant for both 
samples, at the 10% significance level for the US but at the 10% level for Europe. Not only 
are the significance levels different but the signs of the coefficients are also opposite. For the 
US the coefficient is -0.9513 which indicates that for each standard deviation difference 
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between the SGA of the acquirer and the target the post-M&A performance is decreased by 
0.9513 standard deviations of ROA. That supports the H1 hypothesis that similarities in SGA 
values of the acquiring company and the target company have positive effect on post-M&A 
performance. For Europe, on the other hand, the coefficient is positive and taking a value of 
1.3653 implying that for each standard deviation difference between the SGA of the acquirer 
and the target the post-M&A ROA increases by 1.3653 standard deviations of ROA. That 
supports the opposite hypothesis, H0, that dissimilarities in SGA values of the acquiring 
company and the target company have positive effect on post-M&A performance. Both of 
those results are further supported by previous researches. Ramaswamy (1997) supports the 
result of similarities having a positive effect on post-M&A performance, whereas the result of 
dissimilarities having a positive effect is supported by Harrison et.al. (1991). Although the 
results are different for the US and Europe the difference is opposite of the difference between 
the samples for other variables, that is here similarities in SGA increase post-M&A 
performance for the US whereas dissimilarities increase the post-performance for Europe. The 
reasoning mentioned before, that there might be more difficult in Europe to merge with a firm 
with different resource allocation does not seem to apply in the case of SGA. This is a 
surprising result that does not have any support from either theory or previous studies. 
Working capital (WC) is statistically significant for the US, at the 5% significance level, but 
statistically insignificant for Europe. The slope of the coefficient is 0.7244 for the US which 
indicates that for each standard deviation difference between the companies’ WC the post-
M&A performance increases by 0.7244 standard deviations of ROA. This result supports the 
H0 hypothesis that dissimilarities in WC values of the acquiring company and the target 
company have positive effect on post-M&A performance. Ritterfeldt and Trygg (2008) 
further support this result which is based on efficiency transfer. Again, different results for the 
US and Europe can presumably be attributed to different governance structures and the 
reasoning that it might be more difficult for companies in Europe to merge with a company 
with different resource allocations, compared to the US and dissimilarities might more likely 
have a positive effect on post-M&A performance in the US.  
Both of the dummy variables used as proxies for corporate culture, Industry (IND) and 
Country (COU), are statistically insignificant for both the US and Europe as well as the whole 
sample. As for the other insignificant explanatory variables, even though they cannot be 
analyzed further, it seems reasonable to assume that neither similarities nor dissimilarities in 
corporate culture have any effect on post-M&A performance. A reasoning for these 
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insignificant results can in some way come from van Oudenhoven and van Der Zee’s (2002) 
contradicting suggestion that it can be harder to obtain synergies in cross border M&A’s and 
the positive effects might be cancelled out by cultural integration problems leading to 
statistical insignificance. 
As can be seen in the bottom line of Table 4.4, R2 is relatively high, especially for the whole 
sample and the US, which indicates that a large part of the variability in the change in ROA is 
explained by the variability in the explanatory variables, making the regression look good as a 
whole. However, a large part of the explanatory variables are found insignificant. These 
results, high R2 and insignificant explanatory variables are attributable to the problem of near 
multicollinearity since some of the explanatory variables are found highly correlated.  
However, it is worth mentioning again that the results analyzed above have to be taken with 
caution due to the apparent problem of multicollinearity, which can distort the results and 
make it harder to draw firm conclusions. 
4.4 Discussion 
Out of the explanatory variables chosen in this study, more variables than anticipated were 
found to have insignificant effect on the change in ROA and others were only statistically 
significant for either the US or Europe. Since most testing procedures in econometrics rely on 
asymptotic theory, meaning that in theory results only hold if there are an infinite number of 
observations, this can be attributed to the small data sample (Brooks, 2008). 
For hypothesis testing it is common to use 5% significance level. However, some 
econometricians have suggested that a lower significance level, e.g. 1%, is more appropriate 
for large samples because if the sample size is sufficiently large, any null hypothesis can be 
rejected and thus all explanatory variables will be statistically significant (Brooks, 2008). It 
could therefore probably also be argued that for smaller samples a higher significance level 
should be used, maybe even higher than 10%. Since this study suffers from a small dataset the 
use of a higher significance level would find more variables to have a statistically significant 
impact on the change in ROA. 
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5. Conclusion 
Unexpectedly, out of the eleven explanatory variables chosen for this study only four are 
found statistically significant for the US; Interest expense, Property, plant and equipment, 
Selling, general and administrative expenses, and Working capital, and three for Europe; Cost 
of goods sold, Interest expense, and Selling, general and administrative expenses. Therefore, 
this study does not provide the same statistical evidence on a strong relationship between pre-
M&A resource allocation and post-M&A performance as previous empirical studies. This 
lack of statistical evidence is most likely attributable to the small dataset at hand. 
However, if looked past the fact that the dummy variable used to divide the whole sample into 
an US sample and a European sample is found insignificant, the variables that are found to 
have statistical significance show that in the US dissimilarities in resource allocation, between 
the acquirer and the target, have positive effect on post-M&A ROA, rather than similarities. 
In Europe on the other hand it is not as clear whether similarities or dissimilarities are 
superior when it comes to increase in post-M&A performance. This is somewhat in line with 
previous studies on resource allocation and M&A performance, which however have not all 
gotten identical results. This indicates that some other factors than only similarities or 
dissimilarities in resource allocation affect post-M&A performance. Here, two factors are 
discussed as having possible influence on M&A performance. 
This study uses data on M&A transactions conducted in the sixth merger wave, from 2003 to 
2007. Compared to the results of previous studies, conducted in calmer periods, this study 
does not indicate that different time periods, in regards of merger activity, support different 
arguments of resource allocation and post-M&A performance. On the other hand, in regards 
of corporate governance systems this study supports the results of some previous researches, 
e.g. Harrison et.al (1991) that dissimilarities in resource allocation, between the acquiring 
company and the target, have positive effect on post-M&A performance in the US. For 
Europe however the results are not as clear, as mentioned before. This might indicate that 
different governance structures support different arguments of resource allocations and post-
M&A performance. However, in light of the lack of research on the connection between 
corporate governance structure and M&A performance it is not less likely that some other 
factor causes the different results or even that there is no actual difference between different 
geographical areas. 
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As has been mentioned earlier the results of this research have to be taken with caution due to 
three problems. First, as a result of a small dataset a large part of the explanatory variables are 
found having insignificant effect on post-M&A performance. Second, since the error terms 
are found to be non-normally distributed the parameters have to be interpreted with caution. 
The third and largest problem, is the problem of multicollinearity which causes distortion in 
the estimates and in the significance tests which makes is harder to draw reliable conclusion 
from the results. Nevertheless the results found indicate that there are probably more 
important factors than resource allocation that are determining when it comes to post-M&A 
performance and successfulness of M&A transactions. 
5.1 Recommendations for further studies 
It would be interesting for further studies to examine the effects of similarities and 
dissimilarities in resource allocation on post-M&A performance using other performance 
measures, e.g. return on equity (ROE) and profit margin. 
Although the insignificance of several of the explanatory variables is likely attributable to the 
small sample size it is interesting to see if other estimators would give more significant results 
than the OLS. The most commonly used estimators, except for OLS, are the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimator and the (general) method of moments ((G)MM) estimator. 
Using other ways to gather the data, e.g. using other databases, might also increase the 
significance of the results. Since the annual statements for several of the companies involved 
were unavailable, for some unapparent reason, in the S&P Capital IQ database other ways of 
obtaining the data might increase the sample size and therefore enhance the credibility of the 
study. 
Given the difference in results, both in this research and previous studies, for the US and 
Europe and the lack of academic research on the influence of corporate governance on M&A 
performance gives an interesting foundation for extensive research on the connection between 
corporate governance systems and M&A performance, as well as other factors that might 
explain these different results. 
Finally, like mentioned earlier, increase in performance is not the only factor that makes an 
M&A transaction successful. Successful M&A transaction also adds value to the owners by 
stock price improvements. A study similar to this one, that focuses on post-M&A value 
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instead of performance would help gaining a better knowledge and understanding of which 
strategies are most likely to result in a successful M&A. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – M&A observations  
List of the US M&A observations, alphabetically ordered by acquirer 
  Acquirer Target 
  ACM Income Fund Inc ACM Government Opportunity Fund Inc 
  Allegheny Valley Bancorp Inc RSV Bancorp Inc  
  Allied Motion Technologies Inc Owosso Corp 
  American National Bankshares Inc Community First Financial Corp  
  American Tower Corp SpectraSite Inc 
  Axonyx Inc OXIS International Inc 
  Benchmark Electronics  Inc Pemstar Inc 
  BNC Bancorp SterlingSouth Bank & Trust Co 
  Bourbon Bancshares Inc Kentucky First Bancorp Inc 
  Capital Bank Corp 1st State Bancorp Inc 
  Carter’s Inc Oshkosh B Gosh Inc 
  Center Bancorp Inc Red Oak Bank 
  Citizens Bancshares Corp CFS Bancshares Inc 
  Consolidated Communications Holdings Inc North Pittsburgh Systems Inc 
  CPB Inc CB Bancshares Inc 
  Darden Restaurants Inc RARE Hospitality International Inc 
  Dendreon Corp Corvas International Inc 
  EpiCept Corp Maxim Pharmaceuticals Inc 
  ESB Financial Corp PHSB Financial Corp 
  Fairchild Semiconductor International Inc System General Corp 
  First National Lincoln Corp FNB Bankshares 
  Flexsteel Industries Inc DMI Furniture Inc 
  Flushing Financial Corp Atlantic Liberty Financial Corp 
  Franklin Financial Services Corp Fulton Bancshares Corp 
  Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc Phelps Dodge Corp 
  Gartner Inc META Group Inc 
  Greene County Bancshares Inc Civitas BankGroup Inc 
  Heritage Commerce Corp Diablo Valley Bank 
  Hudson City Bancorp Inc Sound Federal Bancorp Inc 
  Hyseq Pharmaceuticals Inc Variagenics Inc 
  Latinocare Management Corp Warp 9  Inc 
  Levcor International Inc Carlyle Industries Inc 
  Liberty Property Trust Republic Property Trust 
  Limited Brands Inc La Senza Corp 
  LoJack Corp Boomerang Tracking Inc 
  LSB Bancshares Inc FNB Financial Services Corp 
  Lyondell Chemical Co Millennium Chemicals Inc 
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  MGM Mirage Inc Mandalay Resort Group 
  Monarch Community Bancorp Inc MSB Financial Inc 
  Monmouth Community Bancorp Allaire Community Bank 
  Monmouth Real Estate Investment Corp Monmouth Capital Corp 
  National Mercantile Bancorp FCB Bancorp 
  Nektar Therapeutics AeroGen Inc 
  NL Industries Inc CompX International Inc 
  Olin Corp Pioneer Cos Inc 
  PFSweb Inc eCOST Com Inc 
  Plug Power Inc H Power Corp 
  PMC Commercial Trust Inc PMC Capital Inc 
  Primedex Health Systems Inc Radiologix Inc 
  Provident Financial Services Inc First Sentinel Bancorp Inc 
  Riverwood Holding Inc Graphic Packaging International Corp 
  Robcor Properties Inc Redpoint Bio Corp 
  Salisbury Bancorp Inc Canaan National Bancorp Inc 
  TriCo Bancshares North State National Bank 
  Whirlpool Corp Maytag Corp 
 
List of the European M&A observations, alphabetically ordered by acquirer 
  Acquirer Target 
  A/S Schouw & Co Biomar Holding A/S 
  Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd CoTherix Inc 
  Aixtron AG Genus Inc 
  Aker ASA Aker Philadelphia Shipyard ASA 
  Algo Vision PLC MySparta AG 
  B&N Nordsjofrakt AB Gorthon Lines AB 
  Banche Popolari Unite Scrl Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA 
  Boiron SA Laboratoires Dolisos 
  Bowleven PLC FirstAfrica Oil PLC 
  BVZ Holding AG Gornergrat Bahn AG 
  ComputerLand Poland SA Emax SA 
  CoolGuard AB Iniris AB 
  Derwent Valley Holdings PLC London Merchant Securities PLC 
  Edinburgh UK Tracker Trust PLC Tribune UK Tracker PLC 
  Exploration Co PLC El Oro Mining & Exploration Co 
  Groupe Air France SA Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij 
  Helgeland Sparebank Sparebanken Rana 
  Hellenic Investment Co SA Piraeus Investments SA 
  Hydrobudowa Polska SA Hydrobudowa Slask SA 
  Kulmbacher Brauerei AG Wuerzburger Hofbraeu AG 
  Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG Bank Linth 
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  Nireus Aquaculture SA Kego AE 
  Pirelli & C SpA Pirelli SpA 
  PSP Swiss Property AG REG Real Estate Group 
  Steria SA Xansa PLC 
  Stockmann Oyj Lindex AB 
  Straumann Holding AG Biora AB 
  Swiss Prime Site AG Maag Holding AG 
  Vectura Group Plc Innovata PLC 
  Wienerberger Finance Service B.V. Baggeridge Brick PLC 
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Appendix B – White’s test for heteroscedasticity 
 
  
F-statistic 1.658019     Prob. F(12,73) 0.0945
Obs*R-squared 18.41921     Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.1035
Scaled explained SS 106.7682     Prob. Chi-Square(12) 0.0000
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/20/14   Time: 13:31  
Sample: 1 86    
Included observations: 86   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.131339 0.164108 0.800322 0.4261
CI_^2 0.065478 0.589791 0.111019 0.9119
COGS_^2 0.001044 0.008862 0.117809 0.9065
CA_^2 -0.094217 0.082269 -1.145235 0.2559
IE_^2 -0.323265 0.279247 -1.157631 0.2508
INV_^2 0.000192 0.014101 0.013639 0.9892
LTD_^2 -1.804950 0.506978 -3.560216 0.0007
PPE_^2 0.023420 0.065134 0.359574 0.7202
SGA_^2 0.249021 0.507109 0.491061 0.6249
WC_^2 1.927881 0.548139 3.517139 0.0008
IND^2 0.254697 0.145007 1.756444 0.0832
COU^2 -0.115785 0.211979 -0.546209 0.5866
AREA^2 -0.171064 0.162137 -1.055061 0.2949
R-squared 0.214177     Mean dependent var 0.159447
Adjusted R-squared 0.085000     S.D. dependent var 0.643326
S.E. of regression 0.615377     Akaike info criterion 2.005275
Sum squared resid 27.64431     Schwarz criterion 2.376281
Log likelihood -73.22683     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.154588
F-statistic 1.658019     Durbin-Watson stat 1.994329
Prob(F-statistic) 0.094548    
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Appendix C – Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation 
 
 
F-statistic 1.517111     Prob. F(10,63) 0.1544
Obs*R-squared 16.69051     Prob. Chi-Square(10) 0.0815
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/20/14   Time: 13:39  
Sample: 1 86    
Included observations: 86   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.067676 0.111181 -0.608702 0.5449
CI_ -0.296996 0.394524 -0.752795 0.4544
COGS_ -0.024305 0.061522 -0.395056 0.6941
CA_ -0.050477 0.117307 -0.430294 0.6685
IE_ 0.099741 0.270255 0.369064 0.7133
INV_ -0.067301 0.053853 -1.249713 0.2160
LTD_ 0.131264 0.231775 0.566343 0.5732
PPE_ 0.020727 0.087963 0.235633 0.8145
SGA_ 0.177735 0.269645 0.659144 0.5122
WC_ -0.079465 0.288221 -0.275708 0.7837
IND 0.085994 0.111898 0.768508 0.4451
COU 0.072648 0.179620 0.404454 0.6872
AREA 0.032650 0.117763 0.277253 0.7825
RESID(-1) -0.053385 0.153478 -0.347837 0.7291
RESID(-2) -0.065149 0.128364 -0.507535 0.6136
RESID(-3) 0.210069 0.168364 1.247708 0.2168
RESID(-4) -0.346354 0.140828 -2.459407 0.0167
RESID(-5) -0.208350 0.129507 -1.608789 0.1127
RESID(-6) -0.266952 0.143171 -1.864572 0.0669
RESID(-7) 0.033778 0.139694 0.241800 0.8097
RESID(-8) 0.104479 0.138342 0.755228 0.4529
RESID(-9) -0.118449 0.124418 -0.952020 0.3447
RESID(-10) -0.172135 0.134424 -1.280534 0.2051
R-squared 0.194076     Mean dependent var -1.15E-17
Adjusted R-squared -0.087358     S.D. dependent var 0.401650
S.E. of regression 0.418826     Akaike info criterion 1.320949
Sum squared resid 11.05116     Schwarz criterion 1.977344
Log likelihood -33.80080     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.585118
F-statistic 0.689596     Durbin-Watson stat 2.034228
Prob(F-statistic) 0.832741    
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Appendix D – Bera-Jarque test for normality 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1 86
Observations 86
Mean      -1.15e-17
Median   0.062481
Maximum  1.856200
Minimum -2.200198
Std. Dev.   0.401650
Skewness  -0.955130
Kurtosis   17.08986
Jarque-Bera  724.4537
Probability  0.000000
